112 Iowa L. Rev. 55 (2026)
Abstract
Separation of powers formalists treat the Constitution’s Vesting Clauses—the first sentences of Articles I, II, and III—as sources of substantive law. Perhaps most significantly, formalists often understand the Article II Vesting Clause to give the President plenary power to fire a broad range of executive officials, under the so-called “unitary executive theory.” But the formalist approach to the Vesting Clauses stumbles when it comes to the Article I Vesting Clause, which formalists have neglected. Treating the Article I Vesting Clause as a source of substantive law risks making Article I internally inconsistent. The Article I Vesting Clause says that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” are vested in Congress. Yet Article I goes on to authorize the President to exercise a veto over legislation—precisely what the Article I Vesting Clause would preclude if it were a source of substantive law. Thus, either the presidential veto is a power vested in Congress or the Article I Vesting Clause is not a source of substantive law. Because formalists understand all of the Vesting Clauses as sources of substantive law in the same way, showing that the Article I Vesting Clause is not a source of substantive law implies that the Article II Vesting Clause also is not a source of substantive law. This implication in turn refutes the unitary executive theory, because the unitary executive theory relies on a substantive interpretation of the Article II Vesting Clause. Although recent scholarship has undermined the credentials of the unitary executive theory as a historical matter, this Article provides a more powerful and fundamental refutation of the unitary executive theory: The unitary executive theory rests on flawed assumptions about how the Constitution should be read. If those ostensibly “formalist” assumptions were accepted, they would introduce contradictions into the constitutional text— hardly the faithful reading of constitutional text that formalists purport to offer.