Homeowners in the United States pay residential real estate brokers commission rates that are about twice as high as the commission charges by brokers in comparable countries. Given the enormous size of the residential home sale market—both in aggregate terms and as a percentage of wealth owned by the average homeowner—this cost discrepancy results in U.S. homeowners transferring tens of billions of dollars each year to brokers that would be saved in a more competitive and fair market. In Et Tu, Agent? Commission-Based Steering in Residential Real Estate (“Et Tu?”), Jordan M. Barry, Will Fried, and John William Hatfield provide a superb study establishing the existence of steering by buyer brokers and explaining why this steering creates inflated costs in the U.S. market. This Response lauds the market analysis in Et Tu?, but argues that the solutions proposed by the authors fall short of what is needed to create a competitive and fairly priced residential real estate brokerage. This Response suggests focusing on public enforcement of existing standards-based antitrust, fiduciary duty, and “UDAP” laws. It concludes by identifying three models for public enforcement cases that might yield the necessary market reform—the big case, the catalyst state case, and the piranha method.