111 Iowa L. Rev. Online 1 (2025)
Abstract
Civil forfeiture in the United States faces criticism for how it operates. Many states have responded to this criticism by reforming their civil forfeiture regime. Reforms have included requiring a criminal conviction before engaging in forfeiture, requiring property to exceed a certain value threshold to be eligible for forfeiture, or removing the financial incentive for law enforcement to engage in civil forfeiture. While state reform efforts have generated optimism, there are still obstacles to overcome. This Essay argues that the protections for property owners against forfeiture extended through Iowa’s 2017 Forfeiture Reform Act are in jeopardy because the state has not severed civil forfeiture’s incentive structure that motivates law enforcement to avoid state restrictions through the federal equitable sharing program. This Essay further discusses the history of civil forfeiture in the United States and the creation of the federal equitable sharing program. In doing so, it discusses the problems created by the irrational incentive structure implicit in the forfeiture regime and the ability of law enforcement to avoid civil forfeiture reforms through the federal equitable sharing program. Finally, this Essay surveys state reforms that have addressed these issues in civil forfeiture and uses their examples to provide recommendations for implementation in pursuit of effective forfeiture reform in Iowa.