103 Iowa L. Rev. 1753 (2018)

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Abstract

This Note presents an epistemological analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 403's cumulative evidence clause, which provides for the exclusion of concededly relevant evidence where probative value is outweighed by the risk of needless cumulation. While courts vary in their application of the clause, it generally affords trial judges the discretion to bar admission of evidence that will not further assist the jury in reaching factual conclusions in light of what evidence is already on the record. This Note questions the wisdom of delegating this power to the bench. If the duty of a juror to form reasonable beliefs is best explained by an evidentialist view of epistemic justification, then it seems there can be no principled way for judges to determine whether a piece of legal evidence might bear an impact on juror fact-finding. The rule therefore contemplates an unwarranted judicial guesswork that risks exclusion of potentially important evidence, leaves juries ill-equipped to perform their duties, and may deprive the parties of fair and accurate verdicts. Amending or eliminating the rule to avoid these dangers would come at no cost to federal trial practice.