109 Iowa L. Rev. 2185 (2024)
Abstract
This empirical study explores the disconnect between doctrine and practice in the calculation of the life of permanent injunctions issued in trade secret misappropriation cases. The study draws upon findings from a content analysis of cases decided in federal trial court in the fourteen-year period between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2022.
Case law and scholarly commentary on this topic suggest a legal doctrine that is rich, nuanced, and, indeed, rather elegant in its design. Modern doctrine directs courts to carefully refine the life of a permanent injunction barring further misappropriation by considering the time it would take for the misappropriator (or a good faith competitor) to independently develop the trade secret through legitimate business practices. The resulting injunction life, in theory at least, is fact-dependent, narrowly tailored, and precise in its terms.
The key finding of this study is startling: What is said in doctrine is seldom what is applied in practice by courts in this arena. The great majority of courts issuing permanent injunctions for trade secret misappropriation paid little to no attention to the nuanced rules set forth by statute and case law; instead, they issued sparse permanent injunction provisions that did not reference time limits. In addition, in most instances the parties to the litigation did not engage with doctrine and did not seek more specificity on injunction duration. The study speculates that current practice may be efficient in terms of conserving judicial and litigant resources. However, we should not discount the value of nuanced rules for providing overarching frameworks for decision-making or for guiding outcomes in cases at the margin where the facts demand the application of more refined approaches.
This study thus provides empirical evidence of actual practice regarding permanent injunction life in trade secret misappropriation cases and highlights pathways for future exploration into doctrinal development and judicial decision-making. It demonstrates that scholars, practitioners, and courts alike should approach doctrinal nuances with a degree of caution; it is patently risky to assume that an elegant, refined doctrine, even though articulated in statute or precedent, is necessarily what the parties will assert or what the courts will apply in the trenches of actual litigation.