104 Iowa L. Rev. 2223 (2019)

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Abstract

The expansion of executive power in the United States began in the aftermath of the nation’s involvement in World War II. Slightly earlier, the Soviet Union’s expansion of executive power began in 1917 with the Bolshevik Revolution. Aside from chronology, there were few differences between the expansion of executive power fostered by both global superpowers early in their nationhood. For example, both countries pride themselves in strong executive power, including primarily the ability to detain perceived enemies, convicts, and war criminals. The United States judiciary has repeatedly given enormous deference to the President on these issues, allowing the President to detain individuals nearly absolutely. Furthermore, the ostensible constraints the Constitution places on presidential power have been weakened by judicial precedent, such that the President can easily evade those constraints. Lastly, without a firm definition of what constitutes war, the President has acquired the authority to exercise wartime prerogatives and commit troops without congressional authorization. This Note posits a hypothetical scenario, mirroring the Stalin regime’s Gulags, against which to test current United States law’s weak constraints. The few limitations that have been placed on the Executive Branch have been inadequate and are in desperate need of repair. In the face of little congressional opposition, Presidents have expanded executive power. One such power is virtually unlimited discretionary detention power. In order to reign in this expansive power, the United States should pass and ratify a new constitutional amendment aimed at limiting executive power. In this way, the United States can do what the Soviet Union failed to do—prevent massive political incarcerations in Gulag concentration camps.